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Abstract
Over the last few years, the use of virtualization technolo-
gies has increased dramatically. This makes the demand for
efficient and secure virtualization solutions become more ob-
vious. Container-based virtualization and hypervisor-based
virtualization are two main types of virtualization technolo-
gies that have emerged to the market. Of these two classes,
container-based virtualization is able to provide a more
lightweight and efficient virtual environment, but not without
security concerns. In this paper, we analyze the security level
of Docker, a well-known representative of container-based
approaches. The analysis considers two areas: (1) the inter-
nal security of Docker, and (2) how Docker interacts with the
security features of the Linux kernel, such as SELinux and
AppArmor, in order to harden the host system. Furthermore,
the paper also discusses and identifies what could be done
when using Docker to increase its level of security.
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1 Introduction
The last decade has seen an explosion of development in the
area of virtualization technologies, which allow the partition-
ing of a computer system into multiple isolated virtual en-
vironments. The technologies offer substantial benefits that
have been driving their development rapidly. One of the most
common reasons for adopting virtualization technologies is
server virtualization in data centers. With server virtualiza-
tion, an administrator can create one or more virtual system
instances on a single server. These virtual systems operate as
real physical servers and can be rented out on a subscription
basis. Amazon EC2, Rackspace, and DreamHost are some
popular instances of such data center service providers. An-
other common use is for desktop virtualization, where one
computer can run several OS instances. Desktop virtualiza-
tion provides support for applications that can run only on a
specific OS.
The growth in the use of virtualization technologies pro-
motes the demand for a virtualization solution which can
provide dense, scalable, and secure user environments. A
large number of virtualization solutions have emerged to
the market. They can be classified into two major classes:
container-based virtualization and hypervisor-based virtual-
ization. Of these two classes, container-based virtualization
is able to provide a more lightweight and efficient virtual en-
vironment. It allows ten times more virtual environments to
run on a physical server compared to hypervisor-based virtu-
alization [19]. However, container-based virtualization also
comes with security concerns.
In this paper, we analyze the security level of Docker
[17], a well-known representative of container-based virtu-
alization approach. We consider two areas: (1) the internal
security of Docker, and (2) how Docker interacts with the
security features of the Linux kernel, such as SELinux and
AppArmor, in order to harden the host system. The analysis
examined the internal security of Docker based on the level
of isolation Docker can provide to its virtual environments.
The interaction between Docker and the security features of
the kernel was estimated based on how the features are sup-
ported by Docker. To the best of our knowledge, Docker is a
relatively new technology, and this is one of the first analyses
of this kind that focus on its security aspects.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a
high-level view of the two classes of virtualization solutions.
Section 3 gives an overview of Docker and its underlying
technologies. Section 4 presents our analysis of Docker se-
curity, and then in Section 5, we discuss the security level of
Docker and what could be done to raise its level of security.
The paper concludes with a summary in Section 6.
2 Virtualization Approaches
Most of the virtualization technologies can be classified into
two major approaches: container-based virtualization and
hypervisor-based virtualization. The former provides virtu-
alization at the operating system level, while the latter pro-
vides virtualization at the hardware level. Each of the ap-
proaches has its own advantages and disadvantages, which
are described in this section.
Container-based virtualization is a lightweight virtual-
ization approach using the host kernel to run multiple vir-
tual environments. These virtual environments are often re-
ferred to as containers. Linux-VServer [31], OpenVZ [11],
and Linux Container (LXC) [10] are the three main repre-
sentatives of this approach. The general architecture of a
container-based virtualization solution is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Container-based virtualization virtualizes at the operating
system level, thus allowing multiple applications to operate
without redundantly running other operating system kernels
on the host. Its containers look like normal processes from
outside, which run on top of the kernel shared with the host
machine. They provide isolated environments with neces-
sary resources to execute applications. These resources can
be either shared with the host or installed separately inside
the container.
Hypervisor-based virtualization solutions provide virtu-
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Figure 1: Architecture of Container-based Virtualization
Figure 2: Architecture of Hypervisor-based Virtualization
alization at the hardware level. In contrast to container-based
virtualization, a hypervisor establishes complete virtual ma-
chines (VMs) on top of the host operating system (Fig. 2).
Each virtual machine comprises of not only an application
and its dependencies, but also an entire guest OS along with
a separate kernel. There are two classes of hypervisors: the
Type 1 hypervisor, also known as the bare metal hypervisor,
which works directly on top of the underlying hardware of
the host, and the Type 2 hypervisor, also known as the hosted
hypervisor, which works on top of the host operating system
[26]. Xen [18] is an example of the former, while KVM [25]
is of the latter. Since the Type 1 hypervisor does not include
an extra layer of the host OS, it provides better performance
than the Type 2 hypervisor.
The differences in the architecture bring some benefits to
container-based virtualization over hypervisor-based virtu-
alization. First, container-based virtualization can provide
higherer density of virtual environments. Since a container
does not include an entire OS, the size and the required re-
sources to run an application in a container are less than that
of a VM running the same application. As a result, more con-
tainers than traditional virtual machines can be deployed on
the same host. Secondly, container-based virtualization also
offers better performance. This has been demonstrated by
experiments in some studies [32, 28, 27, 21]. These studies
show that the performance of container-based virtualization
is better than with hypervisor-based virtualization in most
cases, and it is almost as good as native applications.
However, despite all of the mentioned advantages,
container-based virtualization is unable to support a variety
of environments in the way hypervisor-based virtualization
does since all the environments of the containers must be of
the same type as that of the host. For example, Windows
containers cannot be run on top of a Linux host.
Figure 3: Architecture of Docker engine
3 Docker Overview
Docker is an open source container technology with the abil-
ity "to build, ship, and run distributed applications" [17]. It
has been used in some popular applications, such as Spotify,
Yelp, and Ebay.
Although container technologies have been around for
more than a decade, Docker - a relatively new candidate -
is currently one of the most successful technologies since
it comes with new abilities that earlier technologies did not
possess. First, it provides interfaces to simply and safely cre-
ate and control containers. Secondly, developers can pack
applications into lightweight Docker containers which can
operate on almost anywhere without modification. Further-
more, Docker can deploy more virtual environments than
other technologies can on the same hardware [19]. Last
but not least, Docker cooperates well with third-party tools,
which simplify the management and deployment process of
Docker containers. DevOps tools, such as Puppet [13], An-
sible [1], and Vagrant [16] can integrate with Docker, thus
making Docker containers to be easily deployed to a cloud.
Moreover, many orchestration tools, such as Mesos [22],
Shipyard [15], and Kubernetes [7], also support Docker con-
tainers. These tools provide an abstract layer of resources
management and scheduling over Docker.
Docker consists of two major components: Docker engine
and Docker Hub. The former is an open source virtualization
solution, while the latter is a Software-as-a-Service platform
for sharing Docker images. The following sections describe
in details these two components.
3.1 Docker Engine
Docker engine is a lightweight and portable packaging tool
[17] which relies on container-based virtualization. There-
fore, the architecture of the Docker engine (Fig. 3) is simi-
lar to that of container-based virtualization in general. The
Docker containers run on top of the Docker daemon which
is in charge of executing and managing all of the Docker
containers. The Docker client, which provides an user inter-
face for interacting with containers to Docker users, accepts
commands from the users and then sends it to the Docker
daemon through RESTful APIs. Using this method of com-
munication enables the Docker client to run on the same host
as the containers, or even on different hosts.
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Figure 4: Container image
Docker Container
Docker used to commoditize LXC to create Docker contain-
ers. Since version 0.9, Docker has replaced LXC with lib-
container [8] - their own virtualization format - as the default
container environment since Docker community desires not
to depend on a third-party package. However, with either
LXC or libcontainer, namespaces, cgroups, union file sys-
tem, and Docker images are still the major underlying tech-
nologies to implement Docker containers.
Docker takes advantages of two Linux features, names-
paces and cgroups, to safely create virtual environment for
its containers. The cgroups, or control groups, provide
mechanism for accounting and limiting the resources which
the processes in each container can access. The namespaces
wrap the operating system resources into different instances.
The use of these instances gives the processes running inside
a container the illusion that they have their own resources.
Currently, Docker uses five namespaces to provide each con-
tainer with a private view of the underlying host system [23]:
mount, hostname, inter-process communication (IPC), pro-
cess identifiers (PID), and network. Each of them works on
specific types of system resources. The network namespaces,
for example, isolate the networking resources, such as IP ad-
dresses, and IP routing tables, in order to provide each con-
tainer with a separated network stack.
Docker launches its containers from Docker images. A
Docker image is a series of data layers on top of a base im-
age (Fig. 4). Every Docker image starts from a base im-
age, such as Ubuntu base image or OpenSuse base image.
When users make changes to a container, instead of directly
writing the changes to the image of the container, Docker
adds an additional layer containing the changes to the im-
age. For example, if the user installs MySQL to an Ubuntu
image, Docker creates a data layer containing MySQL and
then adds to the image. This process makes the image distri-
bution process more efficiently since only the update needs
to be distributed.
In order to work with multiple layers of an image as it
were a single file system layer, Docker uses a special file
system called Union File System (UnionFS). It allows files
and directories in different file systems to be combined into
a single consistent file system.
3.2 Docker Hub
Docker hub [4] is a central repository of images (both public
and private), via which users can share their customized im-
ages. Users can also search for published images and down-
load them with the Docker client. Furthermore, users can
verify the authenticity and integrity of the downloaded im-
ages since Docker signed and verified the images when their
owner submitted them to the hub.
4 Docker Security Analysis
Security is one of the major challenges when running ser-
vices in virtual environments, especially in a multi-tenant
cloud system. Virtual machines provided by hypervisor-
based virtualization techniques are claimed to be more se-
cure than containers as they add an extra layer of isolation
between the applications and the host. An application run-
ning inside a VM is only able to communicate with the VM
kernel, not the host kernel. Consequently, in order for the
application to escalate out of a VM, it must bypass the VM
kernel and the hypervisor before it can attack the host ker-
nel. On the other hand, containers can directly communicate
with the host kernel, thus allowing an attacker to save a great
amount of effort when breaking into the host system. This
raises a security concern over containers.
Docker is also a container-based virtualization technolo-
gies, thus having the same issue. Our analysis aims to dis-
cover whether Docker provides a safe environment to run
applications. The analysis considers two areas: the internal
security of Docker containers and how Docker containers in-
teract with the additional security systems of the kernel.
4.1 Docker Internal Security
We examine the internal security of Docker based on the
system and attacker model and security requirements as de-
scribed by Reshetova et al. [29] for comparing a number of
the OS-level virtualization technologies.
The system and attacker model is as follows: A single host
machine is running a number of Docker containers c1 ... cn,
on which a subset C of the containers are compromised and
the attacker has full control over those, but the remaining
subset of containers C is still under the control of the legit-
imate users. In this model, the attacker can perform various
types of attacks, such as Denial-of-Service and Privilege es-
calation.
In order to encounter with these attacks, the authors stated
that an OS-level virtualization solution should satisfy the fol-
lowing requirements: process isolation, filesystem isolation,
device isolation, IPC isolation, network isolation and limit-
ing of resources. The next sections present our analysis on
how Docker fulfills the requirements.
Process Isolation
The main goal of process isolation is to prevent compro-
mised containers from using process management interfaces
to interfere with other containers. Docker achieves isolation
of processes by wrapping the processes running in containers
into namespaces and limiting their permissions and visibility
to processes running in the other containers and the underly-
ing host.
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This mechanism operates with the support of the PID
namespaces, which isolate the process ID number space of
a container from that of the host. Since PID namespaces are
hierarchical [12], a process can only see the other processes
in its own namespace or in its "children" namespaces. As a
consequence, once a new namespace is created and assigned
to a container, the host can observe and affect the processes
inside the new PID namespace of the container, but the pro-
cesses inside the container cannot observe or do anything to
the other processes running in the host or in other containers.
If the attacker cannot observe other processes, it is harder to
attack them.
The PID namespaces also allow each container to have its
own init-like process (PID 1), which causes all the processes
in a namespace to be terminated if it is terminated. This
process assists the administrator in completely shutting down
a container when something suspicious is detected.
Filesystem Isolation
In order to achieve filesystem isolation, the filesystems of
the host and containers must be protected from illegitimate
access and modification.
Docker uses the mount namespaces, also called the filesys-
tem namespaces, to isolate the filesystem hierarchy associ-
ated with different containers. The mount namespaces pro-
vide the processes of each container a different view of the
filesystem tree and restrict all the mount events occurring
inside the container to only have impact inside the con-
tainer. However, some of the kernel filesystems are not
namespaced; for example, those under /sys, /proc/sys,
/proc/sysrq − trigger, /proc/irq, and /proc/bus, and a
Docker container needs to mount them in order to operate.
This causes the issue that a container inherits the view of
these filesystems from the host and are able to access them
directly. Docker limits the threats that a compromised con-
tainer could make to the host via these filesystems with the
two filesystems protection mechanisms: (1) removing the
write permission to these filesystems from containers and
(2) not allowing any process of a container to remount any
filesystem within the container [24]. The second mechanism
is achieved by removing the CAP_SY S_ADMIN capa-
bility from containers.
Docker also employs a mechanism called copy-on-write
file system [24]. As mentioned before, Docker creates con-
tainers based on file system images, and a container can write
content to its own base image. When multiple containers are
created on the same image, the copy-on-write file system al-
lows each container to write content to its specific file sys-
tem, thus preventing other containers from discovering the
changes occurring inside the container.
Device Isolation
In Unix, the kernel and applications access the hardware
through device nodes which basically are special files acting
as the interfaces to the device drivers. If a container can ac-
cess some important device nodes, such as /dev/mem (the
physical memory), /dev/sd∗ (the storage) or /dev/tty (the
terminal), it can make serious damage on the host system.
Thus, it is crucial to limit the set of device nodes that a con-
tainer can access.
The Device Whitelist Controller feature [3] of cgroups
provides means to limit the set of devices that Docker al-
lows a container to access. It also prevents the processes
in containers from creating new device nodes. Furthermore,
Docker mounts container images with nodev, meaning that
even if a device node was pre-created inside the image, the
processes in the container using the image cannot use it to
communicate with the kernel. By default, Docker does not
give extended privileges to its containers. Therefore, they
cannot access any devices. However, if the operator exe-
cutes a container as "privileged", Docker grants access to all
devices to the container.
IPC Isolation
The IPC (inter-process communication) is a set of objects
for exchanging data among processes, such as semaphores,
message queues, and shared memory segments. The pro-
cesses running in containers must be restricted so that they
can communicate only via a certain set of IPC resources and
are disallowed to interfere with those in other containers and
the host machine.
Docker achieves IPC isolation by using the IPC names-
paces, which allows the creation of separated IPC names-
paces. The processes in an IPC namespace cannot read or
write the IPC resources in other IPC namespaces. Docker
assigns an IPC namespace to each container, thus preventing
the processes in a container from interfering with those in
other containers.
Network Isolation
Network isolation is important to prevent network-based at-
tacks, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) and ARP spoof-
ing. Containers must be configured in such a way that they
are unable to eavesdrop on or manipulate the network traffic
of the other containers nor the host.
For each container, Docker creates an independent net-
working stack by using network namespaces. Therefore,
each container has its own IP addresses, IP routing tables,
network devices, etc. This allows containers to interact with
each other through their respective network interfaces, which
is the same as how they interact with external hosts.
By default, connectivity between containers as well as to
the host machine is provided using Virtual Ethernet bridge
[5] (Fig. 5). With this approach, Docker creates a virtual eth-
ernet bridge in the host machine, named docker0, that au-
tomatically forwards packets between its network interfaces.
When Docker creates a new container, it also establishes a
new virtual ethernet interface with a unique name and then
connects this interface to the bridge. The interface is also
connected to the eth0 interface of the container, thus allow-
ing the container to send packets to the bridge.
We note here that the default connectivity model of
Docker is vulnerable to ARP spoofing and Mac flooding at-
tacks since the bridge forwards all of its incoming packets
without any filtering.
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Figure 5: The default networking model of Docker
Limiting of Resources
Denial-of-Service (DoS) is one of the most common attacks
on a multi-tenant system, where a process or a group of pro-
cesses attempt to consume all of the resources of the system,
thus disrupting normal operation of the other processes. In
order to prevent this kind of attack, it should be possible to
limit the resources that are allocated to each container.
Cgroups are the key component that Docker employs to
deal with this issue. They control the amount of resources,
such as CPU, memory, and disk I/O, that any Docker con-
tainer can use, ensuring that each container obtains its fair
share of the resources and preventing any container from
consuming all resources. They also allow Docker to con-
figure the limits and constraints related to the resources allo-
cated to each container. For example, one such constraint is
limiting the available CPUs available to a specific container.
4.2 Docker and Kernel Security Systems
Some kernel security systems exist in order to harden the
security of a Linux host system, including Linux capabili-
ties and Linux Security Module (LSM). Linux capabilities
restricts the privileges assigned to each process. LSM pro-
vides a framework which allows the Linux kernel to support
different security models. The LSMs that have been inte-
grated into the official Linux kernel include AppArmor [20],
SELinux [30], and Seccomp [14].
This paper surveys Linux capabilities and two LSMs, Ap-
pArmor [20] and SELinux [30], which Docker currently sup-
ports. Docker can also collaborate with Seccomp but only if
LXC is used; thus, we do not include it in the survey. Even
though Docker does not support other security systems at the
moment, it does not interfere with them. Therefore, these
systems can run independently of Docker containers to pro-
tect the host [2].
Linux Capabilities
As stated in Linux capabilities man page [9], tradition-
ally, Unix systems classified processes into two categories:
privileged processes (owned by superuser or root) and un-
privileged processes (owned by normal users). The kernel
skipped all permission checks on the privileged processes
but conducted full permission checking on unprivileged pro-
cesses. However, the Linux kernel, since version 2.2, divides
CAP_SETPCAP Modify process capabilities
CAP_SY S_MODULE Insert/Remove kernel modules
CAP_SY S_RAWIO Modify Kernel Memory
CAP_SY S_PACCT Configure process accounting
CAP_SY S_NICE Modify Priority of processes
CAP_SY S_RESOURCE Override Resource Limits
CAP_SY S_TIME Modify the system clock
CAP_SY S_TTY _CONFIG Configure tty devices
CAP_AUDIT_WRITE Write the audit log
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL Configure Audit Subsystem
CAP_MAC_OV ERRIDE Ignore Kernel MAC Policy
CAP_MAC_ADMIN Configure MAC Configuration
CAP_SY SLOG Modify Kernel printk behavior
CAP_NET_ADMIN Configure the network
CAP_SY S_ADMIN Catch all
Table 1: Some capabilities disallowed in Docker containers
[24]
the privileges of the superuser into capabilities, which the
kernel can independently enable or disable.
Docker containers run on a kernel shared with the host
system, so most of their tasks can be handled by the host.
As a result, in most cases, it is unnecessary to provide
full root privileges to a container, thus removing some of
the root capabilities from a container does not affect the
usability or functionality of the container but effectively
improves the security of the system. For example, the
CAP_NET_ADMIN capability, which provides the abil-
ity to modify the system network, can be removed from a
container since all networking configuration can be handled
by the Docker daemon before starting the container.
Docker allows configuration of the capabilities that a con-
tainer can use. By default, Docker disables a large number of
Linux capabilities from its containers in order to prevent an
intruder to damage the host system even when the intruder
has obtained root access within a container. Some of the
capabilities are presented in table 1, and their detailed de-
scription can be found in the Linux capabilities man page
[9].
SELinux
SELinux is a security enhancement to the Linux system.
Linux comes with the standard Discretionary Access Con-
trols (DAC) mechanism (i.e., owner/group and permission
flags of an object) to control the access to an object. SELinux
provides an additional layer of permission checking, called
Mandatory Access Control, after the standard DAC is per-
formed. In SELinux, everything is controlled by labels. Ev-
ery file/directory, process, and system object has a label. The
administrator of the system uses these labels to write rules to
control access between processes and system objects. These
rules are called policies. The SELinux policies can be di-
vided into three classes: Type enforcement, Multi-level secu-
rity (MLS) enforcement, and Multi-category security (MCS)
enforcement.
With the DAC mechanism, owners have full discretion
over their objects, meaning that if the owners are compro-
mised, the attacker has control over all of their objects. In
SELinux model, in contrast, the kernel manages and enforces
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all of the access controls over objects, not their owners. This
provides a secure separation for containers as it can prevent
processes, even with root privileges, within a container to
illegitimately access objects outside the containers.
Docker uses two classes of policy enforcement: Type en-
forcement and MCS enforcement [24]. The Type enforce-
ment protects the host from the processes in containers, and
the MCS enforcement protects a container from another con-
tainer.
With Type enforcement, Docker labels all container pro-
cesses with svirt_lxc_net_t type and all content within a
container with svirt_sandbox_file_t type. The processes
running with svirt_lxc_net_t type can only access/write to
the content labeled with svirt_sandbox_file_t type, but
not to any other label on the system. Therefore, the pro-
cesses running within containers can only use the content in-
side containers. However, only with this policy enforcement,
Docker allows the processes in one container to have access
to the content of other containers. MCS enforcement is nec-
essary to solve this issue. When a container is launched, the
Docker daemon picks a random MCS label and then puts this
label on all of the processes and content of the container. The
kernel only allow processes to access content with the same
MCS label, thus preventing a compromised process in one
container from attacking other containers.
AppArmor
AppArmor is also a security enhancement model to Linux
based on Mandatory Access Control like SELinux, but re-
stricting its scope to individual programs. It permits the
administrator to load a security profile into each program,
which limits the capabilities of the program. AppArmor sup-
ports two modes: enforcement mode and complain/learning
mode. The enforcement mode enforces the policies defined
in the profile. However, in the complain/learning mode, the
violations of profile policies are permitted, but also logged.
This log can be useful for developing new profiles later.
On systems that support AppArmor, Docker provides an
interface for loading a pre-defined AppArmor profile when
launching a new container. This profile is loaded into
the container in enforcement mode in order to ensure that
the processes in the container are restricted according to
the profile. If the administrator does not specify a profile
when launching a container, the Docker daemon automat-
ically loads a default profile to the container, which de-
nies access to important filesystems on the host, such as
/sys/fs/cgroups/ and /sys/kernel/security/.
5 Discussion
The analysis shows that Docker provides a high level of iso-
lation and resource limiting for its containers using names-
paces, cgroups, and its copy-on-write file system, even with
the default configuration. It also supports several kernel se-
curity features, which help to hardening the security of the
host. The only problem we found with Docker was related
to its default networking model. The virtual ethernet bridge
which Docker uses as its default networking model, is vul-
nerable to ARP spoofing and MAC flooding attacks since
it does not provide any filter on the network traffic passing
through the bridge. However, this problem can be solved if
the administrator manually adds filtering, such as ebtables
[6], to the bridge, or changes the networking connectivity to
a more secure one, such as virtual network.
It is also worth highlighting that if the operator runs a con-
tainer as "privileged", Docker grants full access permissions
to the container, which is nearly the same as that of processes
running natively on the host. Therefore, it is more secure to
operate containers as "non-privileged".
Furthermore, even though containers can provide higher
density of virtual environments and better performance, they
have a bigger attack surface than virtual machines since con-
tainers can directly communicate with the host kernel. How-
ever, it is possible to reduce the attack surface while main-
taining these advantages. For example, this can be achieved
by placing containers inside virtual machines.
6 Conclusion and Future work
Container-based virtualization can provide higher den-
sity virtual environments and better performance than
hypervisor-based virtualization. However, the latter is ar-
gued to be more secure than the former. In this paper,
we conducted an analysis on Docker, which is one of the
most popular container-based virtualization technologies, to
discover how safe its containers are. Our analysis shows
that Docker containers are fairly secure, even with the de-
fault configuration. The security level of Docker contain-
ers could also be increased if the operator runs them as
"non-privileged" and enables additional hardening solutions
in Linux kernel, such as AppArmor or SELinux.
The future work after this paper could be to compare the
security of Docker containers with that of other container-
ization systems or with virtual machines. Such studies could
lead to e.g. a detailed static analysis Docker or a broader
view of security in containers in general.
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